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CONSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN THE 




INTRODUCTION: THEME AND METHOD 
 
Political Power and the Governmental Process, by Karl Loewenstein, is one of 
those rare pieces of Modern scholarship that explicitly pays attention to the 
practical significance of constitutions. Writing in the 1950s, Loewenstein was 
interested in “the concordance of the reality of the power process with the norms 
of the constitution.”2 He noted the lack of attention for this topic and was very 
aware of the fact that a constitution does not operate automatically once it has 
been adopted: “A constitution is what power holders and power addressees make 
of it in practical application.”3 That provokes questions about the dynamics 
between constitutional law and socio-political practice, or between the formal and 
material validity of a constitution? Under what conditions can we, for example, 
speak of a constitution that is embraced in practice, to the benefit of a nation and 
of the well being of its population? Loewenstein, a Jewish émigré from Nazi 
Germany who became an American citizen, was troubled by these questions, and 
was one of the few scholars to study conflict and stability in the basic 
constitutional order in a more systematic way.4 To be sure, there is, today, more 
attention than ever before for the types of —interdisciplinary— questions 
Loewenstein asked.5 But this doesn’t preclude the fact that, in European academic 
circles, a specifically legal or normative approach is still dominant.6 
In this article I will study the dynamics between constitutional law and its 
socio-political environment by focusing on the two jurisdictions with which I am 
most familiar, i.e., Belgium and the Netherlands. Both countries, situated in the 
North-western part of Europe and neighbouring each other, are relatively small 
                                                          
1 V-Fund professor of Democratic Governance and Rule of Law, and professor of General 
Jurisprudence at Tilburg University Law School (the Netherlands). Visting professor at both 
Antwerp and Leuven Universities (Belgium). 
2 The University of Chicago Press, Chicago/London, 1957 (2nd edition 1965), p. 147-148. 
3 Ibid., p. 148. 
4 Loewenstein was trained as both a lawyer and a political scientist. For an intellectual biography, 
see Markus Lang, Karl Loewenstein, Transatlantischer Denker der Politik, Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 2007, 353 pp. 
5 The work of for example Tom Ginsburg c.s. is relevant here. See, e.g.: The Endurance of 
National Constitutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009 (together with Z. Elkins 
and J. Melton). 
6 A. von Bogdandy, “Comparative Constitutional Law: a Contested Domain”, in M. Rosenfeld and 
A. Sajo, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012, p. 28. 
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and highly affluent. They partly speak the same language. Yet they could not be 
more different in terms of the just mentioned dynamics.7 
Comparative law can be of particular significance here. Indeed, 
comparatists must immerse themselves in at least two legal systems. However, 
such an ‘involved’ activity does not come naturally. It means that you have to 
deal with, and convey information about, legal systems whose ‘language’ 
(metaphorically understood) you do not necessarily speak, i.e., systems with 
specific institutions and unexpressed codes, their own history, ideolog(y)(ies) and 
self-image(s); systems you have not normally been trained, educated or 
disciplined in, and with which you are therefore not naturally or intimately 
connected. This process of trying to understand, and convey to the reader, foreign 
legal systems (or some of their elements) demands a particular approach because 
it goes far beyond mere fact-finding and the regular (i.e., purely national) way of 
interpretation and understanding the law, where one almost self-evidently and 
implicitly engages in its social context. In any case, the issues that the law 
addresses, as well as the solutions that it intends to provide them, are very much 
connected to the socio-political environment from which these problems and 
solutions arise. Therefore, comparative law explicitly calls for being able to relate 
to the socio-political and cultural context of the topic or issue that is being 
studied8, and do so in a way that is comprehensible to the reader. Comparison can 
moreover sharpen the powers of description of each of the jurisdictions under 
consideration here because sensible―real!9―comparison asks to describe these 
systems vis-à-vis each other (contrasting and connecting!). 
Comparison and contextualisation is indeed what can be of particular help 
when we want to better understand the dynamics between a constitution and its 
socio-political environment. But lawyers are used to studying constitutions merely 
                                                          
7 Borrowing from David Nelken, I understand the term constitutional culture, in its most general 
sense, as one way of describing relatively stable patterns of behaviour and attitudes towards 
constitutional norms. D. Nelken, “Defining and Using the Concept of Legal Culture”, in E. Örücü 
and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative Law. A Handbook, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 113. 
8 On this, see M. Adams, “Doing What Doesn’t Come Naturally. On the Distinctiveness of 
Comparative Law”, in M. Van Hoecke (ed.), Methodology of Legal Research, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2011, p. 229-233. Also M. de S.-O. –L É. Lasser, “The Question of Understanding”, in 
P. Legrand and R. Munday (eds.), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 200-202 and J. Bell, “Legal Research and the 
Distinctiveness of Comparative Law”, in M. Van Hoecke (ed.), o.c. , p. 155-176. 
9 This seems to be lacking many times; but as Shapiro in 1981 already noted, comparative law 
should nevertheless be something more than mere ‘auslandrechtkunde’: “For the most part 
[comparative law] has consisted of showing that a certain procedural or substantive law of one 
country is similar to or different from that of another. Having made the showing, no one knows 
quite what to do next. Or, alternatively, comparison consists of presenting descriptions of a 
number of legal systems side by side, again with no particular end in view.” M. Shapiro, Courts. A 
Comparative and Political Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1981, vii. This of 
course doesn’t preclude that even the sheer description of a foreign legal system will inevitably, 
albeit implicitly, make the researcher reflect about her own legal system. F. von Benda- 
Beckmann, “Ethnologie und Rechtsvergleichung”, 17 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 
1981, p. 310. 
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as legal phenomena, and political scientists, if they do so at all, tend to study 
constitutions exclusively as social phenomena.10 The explicit aim in this text is to 
integrate these two approaches. “[K]nowledge of the constitutional text alone 
equate[s], [not] even nearly, to an understanding of political reality”, some 
colleagues wrote a few years ago. “[B]ut”, they added, “it is a necessary condition 
of that understanding.”11 This indicates reciprocity, and what we should pay 




SOME FACTS ABOUT CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN BELGIUM 




Belgium today has some 10.6 million inhabitants, and is a small and affluent 
country. It is notorious for its many politically and constitutionally salient 
divisions: linguistically, ideologically, culturally, regionally, economically, etc. 
The proliferation of these divisions recently resulted in the country experiencing a 
profound political and institutional crisis, having no federal government for 541 
(!) days,13 a world record apparently. 
Belgium is organised around two dominant language and cultural 
communities (demoi): the Dutch-speaking part in the north (called Flanders, with 
a population of some 6.1 million people, referred to as Flemings) and the French-
speaking part in the south (called Wallonia, making up 55% of the land in the 
country and with 3.4 million residents known as Walloons). A language border, 
officially marked by the legislator in 1962-63 and entrenched in 1970 in Section 4 
of the Constitution,14 separates the two communities and has resulted in a rigid 
division of the country into linguistic areas. The fact that within such an area a 
language is recognized as the main official language means that it is also the 
                                                          
10 Cfr. A. Harding and P. Leyland, “Comparative Law in Constitutional Contexts”, in E. Örücü 
and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative Law. A Handbook, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006, p. 322-323. 
11 S.E. Finer, V. Bogdanor and B. Rudden, Comparing Constitutions, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995, p. 5. 
12 An English version of the text of the Belgian Constitution can be found on: 
http://legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions 
13 Since 26 April 2010. The new federal government was installed on 6 December 2011. The 
government formation process of 2007 took 194 days. 
14 Since in the context of this chapter this is a telling provision, I quote the text in full: “Belgium 
comprises four linguistic regions: the Dutch-speaking region, the French-speaking region, the 
bilingual region of Brussels-Capital and the German-speaking region. Each municipality of the 
Kingdom forms part of one of these linguistic regions. The boundaries of the four linguistic 
regions can only be changed or corrected by a law passed by a majority of the votes cast in each 
linguistic group in each House, on condition that a majority of the members of each group is 
present and provided that the total number of votes in favor that are cast in the two linguistic 
groups is equal to at least two thirds of the votes cast.” 
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language of administration, government, education and justice. As a result, Dutch 
is the official language in the north and French in the south. However, Brussels, 
with some 1.1 million inhabitants, has been constitutionally recognized as a 
bilingual area —Dutch and French-speaking— but has a predominantly 
francophone population.15 In effect, some 60% of the Belgian population is 
Dutch-speaking and some 40% French-speaking. Constitutional recognition has 
also been granted to a small German-speaking part of the country (bordering 
Germany and with some 75,000 residents). 
In addition, there are a limited number of municipalities —situated on the 
language border and also bordering the so-called Brussels-Capital Region (see 
below)— where a substantial number of Dutch and French-speaking people reside 
and where language facilities are granted to those who speak the ‘minority’ 
language, i.e., the language that is not the official language.16 They can use the 
language of their choice in matters relating to, e.g., administration, schooling of 
children (6-12 years old) and justice. These municipalities are called ‘facility 
municipalities’ and are also obliged to communicate with these citizens in the 
language of the ‘minority’ language speakers’ choice. So, too, do all forms and 
official communications have to be available in ―depending on the language area 
in which a municipality is situated― either Dutch and French, or German and 
French. However, in communications between such a municipality on the one 
hand and the regional or federal authorities under which the municipality resorts 
on the other hand, the official language is the norm, as it is for communications 
within the municipal administration itself. In other words, language facilities are a 
service for the citizens and not for the administration. To be sure, individual 
linguistic liberty is protected in Section 30 of the Constitution (and has been since 
1831, when Belgium was established as an independent State), and the 
aforementioned arrangements are only applicable in the relation between the 
citizens and the state; the choice of language used in private and social life, 
including commercial activities, is in principle free. 
Belgium, as Section 1 of the Constitution has stated since 1993, “is a 
federal state composed of Communities and Regions.” Belgian federalism is 
organized, as is clear from this provision, on the basis of a double subdivision into 
Communities and Regions,17 each having its own legislative and executive 
                                                          
15 Historically Brussels was a Dutch-speaking city. Nowadays, during office hours, with many 
Flemish commuters coming to work there, it is a bilingual city. 
16 Which in practice might well be the majority language, since the official language ius based on 
a dated language count. As a result, where, for example, French is not the official language, this 
does not rule out the possibility that sometimes the majority of the population in these 
municipalities are first and foremost French-speaking. This can especially be the case in the 
municipalities surrounding Brussels. 
17 In this text I use capitals whenever I refer to these officially recognized Communities and 
Regions and their competences. When these capitals are not used I refer to the non-official, i.e., 
colloquial, meaning of the words. 
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jurisdiction. By way of several state reforms18 there has, since 1970, been a 
progressive transfer of powers from the federal level to these Communities and 
Regions. Between them on the one hand and the federal level on the other hand, 
there is no legislative hierarchy; all can enact legislation, for which they are 
exclusively competent, and all legislation enacted by the Communities and 
Regions is on a par with federal legislation. 
There are three constitutionally recognized Communities, of which the so-
called Flemish and French Communities are the most prominent ones. There is 
also a small German-Speaking Community in the eastern part of the country. The 
Communities are mainly competent in relation to specific subject matters of 
cultural concern to the respective Dutch, French and German-speaking 
populations in Belgium. However, they also have exclusive jurisdiction over what 
are termed personal matters: certain aspects of health care, family policy, 
education, and such like. This competence is territorially defined: it stops at the 
language border.19 For example, the Flemish Community is not competent in the 
French Community. The situation in Brussels, however, is an exception to the 
territorial rule. There the Flemish Community has competence in these matters 
with regard to the Dutch-speaking residents, and the French Community with 
regard to the French-speaking ones. To give but one example: it is the Flemish 
Community that has competence with respect to schools in Brussels that teach in 
Dutch, and the French Community with respect to schools that teach in French. 
Belgium is further divided into three Regions: the Flemish, the Walloon 
and the Brussels-Capital Regions. These Regions are mainly and exclusively 
competent in certain economic matters in their respective areas: environment, 
agriculture, energy, employment policy, public transport, international 
cooperation connected to these competences, area development and planning, etc. 
There is no German Region; it is the Walloon Region that has competence in the 
German-speaking part of Belgium. 
Complementing this federalized structure, the federal government and 
bicameral federal parliament have decision-making powers extending across the 
whole country, especially concerning issues that are not expressly left to the 
Regions or Communities. So, although the Regions and Communities have 
significant competences, federal institutions retain a fair share of powers. Key 
issues like social security, police, immigration, foreign policy, justice and fiscal 
policy are still, to a large extent, in the hands of the federal government and 
parliament. 
                                                          
18 Five in all: 1970, 1980, 1988-89, 1993 and 2001. At the time of this chapters composition there 
was more or less agreement on a sixth state reform, but it had yet to be laid down in legislation 
and implemented. 
19 Although there still is political disagreement on the issue of territorial competence: some 
French-speaking politicians claim that the competences of the Communities are personally rather 
than territorially defined. This would imply that the French Community would be competent with 
respect to the French-speaking population of Flanders. There is however an authoritative line of 
case law by the Belgian Cour constitutionnelle as well as the Conseil d’Etat that confirms the 
principle of territoriality in this context, although there are exceptions to this. 
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The federal government depends on a majority in parliament; Belgium is 
thus a parliamentary democracy (as well as a mainly ceremonial monarchy). In 
federal parliament, which has competence towards the federal constitution (the 
term is a tad deceptive, as it is in fact the only one in the federation), there is a 
clear Dutch-speaking majority: 62 of the members of the Chamber of 
Representatives belong to the French-speaking language group, while 88 belong 
to the Dutch-speaking language group; in the Senate the numbers are 29 and 44 
respectively. From a numerical point of view, Dutch-speaking members of 
parliament could impose their will on the minority of francophone 
parliamentarians. In reality, of course, things are not quite that simple in a 
federation whose main organisational principle is language. Not only has 
linguistic parity been mandatory, in the Federal Council of Ministers since 1970 
(Section 99 Constitution), decisions that concern the organisation of the state 
moreover have to be taken by a two-thirds majority in federal parliament, as well 
as by a majority in each of the two language groups in this parliament (the 
requirement is described in Section 4 of the Constitution and referred to 
throughout). Interestingly enough this can be done without constitutional 
amendment, but by so-called “special legislation”; it is a technique that is 
prescribed for most Belgian institutional reforms. So while a two-thirds majority 
can change the Constitution itself after a complicated and lengthy procedure, 
institutional reform must meet even stricter demands, even if such reform follows 
a ‘regular’ legislative procedure. Consequently, institutional reforms are 
impossible without a special majority in federal parliament, and 31 members of 
the federal Chamber of Representatives or 15 members of the federal Senate can 
block them. To put it differently, an institutional reform can never be achieved 
against the will of a majority in one of the language groups, even if this majority 
is representative of a minority in Belgium (as is the case with the French-speaking 
language group in federal parliament). 
Moreover, whenever a 75% majority of one of these language groups in 
one of the chambers of federal parliament declares that the relations between the 
different communities in Belgium may deteriorate as a result of a federal 
legislative proposal (as long as they are not dealing with budgets and do not 
concern laws requiring a special majority), the legislative procedure will be 
postponed (Section 54 Constitution). This is known as the alarm bell procedure 
and the idea behind it is to prevent one of the language groups in federal 
parliament from pushing through a legislative proposal against the will of the 
other language group in parliament. When the alarm bell is raised, the Council of 
Federal Ministers, which is composed on the basis of linguistic parity, must then, 
within 30 days, advise parliament on the issue concerned. As can readily be 
imagined, such a procedure puts enormous pressure on the federal government+ if 
it cannot come to an agreement, it will almost certainly fall, with representatives 
of the two language groups subsequently having to negotiate a new government 
on a subject about which there is fundamental disagreement. Thus, the alarm bell 
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procedure has preventive or dissuasive quality and the political factions in 
parliament will not easily raise the alarm.20 
Belgium’s transition in the 1970s and 1980s, from a unitary state to a 
federal one, ultimately resulted in judicial constitutional review being accepted, 
initially solely in order to resolve conflicts of competence between the different 
levels of government. As there was no hierarchy of legislative instruments 
enacted by the various entities of the Belgian state, conferring those powers could 
cause conflicts of competence between the Communities/Regions and the federal 
state. To resolve these conflicts, it was felt that a constitutionally created body 
was needed, as leaving this to the parliaments would lead to a situation where 
Belgium would become ungovernable. Instead of assigning this role to the 
existing courts, the initiators of a constitutional amendment of 1980 chose to set 
up a special court, the so called Cour d’arbitrage (Court of Arbitration), which 
would adjudicate on disputes between the various legislatures of the federal 
Belgian state.21 The Cour d’arbitrage could thus check whether legislation 
introduced by the Federal state, or the Communities or Regions was in line with 
the competences that were assigned to them by the Belgian constitution. 
The twelve bench seats were evenly divided between Dutch-speaking and 
French-speaking Belgians, with at least one of the judges required to have an 
adequate knowledge of German. But the originators of the Cour d’arbitrage also 
paid particular attention to the background of these judges: three judges from each 
language group are former politicians, i.e., they must have served in a legislative 
assembly for at least five years. Through their work as parliamentarians, they are 
presumed to have developed the requisite skills needed to bring their knowledge 
                                                          
20 This alarm bell mechanism exists next to the so-called conflict of interests procedure, which is 
applicable between the different entities of the Belgian federal state. More specifically it is about a 
conflict that arises when the profession of competences by one of the parliaments of the 
Communities, Regions or Federation is believed to be harmful to the interest of one or more of the 
other entities (thus possibly contravening federal loyalty, as laid down in Section 143 of the 
Constitution). When, after consultations between the different entities no solution for the conflict 
is forthcoming, the case is sent to a “consultation committee”, composed of 12 members of the 
federal, Regional and Community governments, which has to find an agreement. If it does not, the 
issue is tabled again in the assembly where it was first dealt with (after which another assembly 
might initiate the procedure again). This procedure can delay a legislative procedure for quite 
some time. A similar procedure exists for conflicts of interest between the different governments. 
Of course, since this procedure concerns the different autonomous entities of the Belgian 
federal state, the political consequences are not necessarily as drastic when compared to the alarm 
bell procedure (which, as we saw, deals within one and the same level of the Belgian federal 
state): the continued existence of any of the governments is not dependent on a political majority 
in a parliament to which it does not depend on. 
21 On this M. Adams and G. van der Schyff, “Political Theory Put to the Test. Comparative Law 
and the Origins of Judicial Constitutional Review”, 10/2 Global Jurist 2010: 
http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol10/iss2/art8 and P. Peeters, “Expanding Constitutional Review by 
the Belgian ‘Court of Arbitration’”, 11 European Public Law 2005, pp. 475-479. 
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of political sensitivities in order to apply them to their judicial duties.22 The other 
judges are jurists from the Court of Cassation or the Council of State, professors 
of law at Belgian universities, or clerks (called ‘legal secretaries’) within the 
Court itself. The purpose of this mixed composition, seeking to balance theory 
and practice, was to render the principle of judicial constitutional review palatable 
to the legislature. In addition, these judges are appointed by the King on the 
recommendation of one of the Houses of Federal Parliament, in an effort to 
partially obviate the ‘democratic impediment’ to constitutional review by the 
judiciary: namely that of unelected judges reviewing and nullifying legislation 
created by the people’s chosen representatives. Moreover, the required two-thirds 
majority for appointment proposals was intended to make the Cour d’arbitrage 
reflect as accurately as possible the political and ideological movements in the 
country. 
As said, the Cour d’arbitrage was originally only authorised to verify 
whether legislation enacted by the federal government, the Communities, or the 
Regions was in accordance with the constitutional division of legislative powers. 
In time, however, this jurisdiction gradually came to expand. For instance, since 
1989 the Court was also required to determine whether the right to equal 
treatment, the right not to be discriminated, and the right to freedom of education 
were violated (encapsulated in the Sections 10, 11, and 24 of the Belgian 
Constitution respectively). Finally, the Court’s formal powers were extended to 
include all provisions of Title II of the Belgian Constitution (“On Belgians and 
Their Rights”). As a consequence, the raison d’être of the Court is no longer the 
federalisation of the Belgian state alone, but also the judicial protection of its 
citizens and their fundamental rights. Eventually, the name Cour d’arbitrage was 
changed to Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) in order to do justice to 
its present powers. 
In sum, Belgium can, on the one hand, be characterised by what might 
called warehouse federalism: a polity in which the different constituent parts of 
the state are competent in different matters, sometimes even in the same 
geographical area (i.e., Brussels). On the other hand, Belgium’s layout is also 
characterized by what might be called a blocked constitution, i.e., a constitution 
on whose basis a minority can freeze any decision concerning institutional and 
constitutional reform. As far as state reforms and related matters are concerned, it 
is almost as if the majority is structurally in a minority position; it is a 
constitutional paradox.23 Today, all this makes for eight parliaments and eight 
governments,24 next to ten provinces and a constitutional court, and also one King 
(and two Queens!). 
                                                          
22 These court officials were not required to be jurists (unlike the other judges). It should be noted 
that appointing ‘political’ judges to the Belgian constitutional court did meet with criticism 
because of the lack of independence and impartiality this would allegedly bring about. 
23 J. Velaers, “De crisis van de staat en de achillespees van het staatsrecht” [The crisis of the state 
and the achilles heel of constitutional law], Rechtskundig Weekblad 2011-2012, p. 24. 
24 Each government comes with a parliament. The parliaments are: Federal Parliament (which is 






The situation could not be more different in the Netherlands. This is remarkable in 
light of the fact that the two countries, at one point, were one. After the 
Napoleonic wars, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was established in the 
Low Countries in 1815. This Kingdom encompassed both the northern provinces 
that nowadays constitute the Netherlands and the southern provinces that 
nowadays constitute Belgium. Support for the policies of the first monarch of the 
United Kingdom, King William I, was far less strong in the south than it was in 
the north. In the south, Roman Catholics and liberals pursued greater liberty in 
shaping their own identities. The Roman Catholics sought freedom of religion 
from the Protestant north, while the liberals wanted better representation: southern 
underrepresentation in the States General, i.e., the parliament based in the 
northern provinces, was indeed sorely felt by many in the region. In addition, the 
francophone population found it hard to stomach William’s Dutch-language 
politics. Matters eventually came to a head when, in 1830, the pursuit of liberty 
sparked a revolution, and the southern part of the country seceded from the 
northern part. 
Nowadays, the Netherlands is a small unitary country, with some 17 
million inhabitants. Just like Belgium it is highly affluent and densely populated. 
It is also a (mainly) ceremonial monarchy.26 The Netherlands has traditionally, 
and for a long time already, been a country of minorities, especially in religious 
and political terms. This also shows in electoral results: since the introduction of 
universal suffrage in 1917, no political party has ever been able to succeed in 
winning a parliamentary majority.27 
Parliament, which consists of two chambers, is situated in The Hague. The 
so-called Second Chamber is the more political one of the two, and consists of 
150 members, who are elected once every four years ―if there are no new 
                                                                                                                                                              
Community); Parliament of the Walloon Region; Parliament of the French Community; 
Parliament of the German-Speaking Community; Parliament of the Brussels-Capital Region; 
Combined Assembly of the Common Community Commission; Assembly of the French 
Community Commission; and Assembly of the Flemish Community Commission. The last four 
parliaments/assemblies are composed of the same people, each time exerting other competences. 
Depending on the definition of parliament, the count may differ from the one given here. H. Vuye, 
for example, refers to nine parliaments, counting Federal Parliament, because of its two Chambers, 
double. H. Vuye, “België: een Staat in hervorming of in ontbinding?” [Belgium: a State in reform 
or in corruption?], Ars Aequi 2008, p. 719-724. To avoid making matters even more complex, I 
will disregard the ten provinces (each of which also have an assembly) and the 589 Belgian 
municipalities. 
25 An English version of the text of the Dutch Constitution can be found on: 
http://legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions 
26 A useful and more detailed overview about Dutch political history and institutional shape can be 
found in R. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
27 Ibid., p. 22-23. 
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elections as a result of government collapse― through a system of proportional 
representation. The First Chamber, also informally called Senate, consists of 75 
members who are elected every 4 years by the members of the provincial councils 
(i.e., 12 councils with 564 members in total, accounting for 12 provinces). Its 
election, however, does not coincide with elections for the Second Chamber. The 
position of Senator is a part time one, for one day a week, with no parliamentary 
assistance. Its members come from all sectors of society. Although having more 
or less the same powers of governmental oversight as the Second Chamber, the 
First Chamber has no right of legislative initiative or even amendment, but 
nevertheless has to approve of legislation accepted by the Second Chamber. It can 
only fully accept or reject this legislation, making for a rather intricate and 
complicated relation between the First and Second Chamber. Constitutional 
convention has it that the First Chamber is supposed to mainly look at technical 
issues of legislative quality (chamber of reflexion), but once in a while it behaves 
more politically. Its existence and legitimacy has been a matter of debate for years 
already, especially when it contravenes the Second Chamber on political topics.28 
Just like Belgium, next to being a monarchy, the Netherlands is a parliamentary 
democracy, which means that the existence of the government is dependent upon 
a majority in parliament (especially the Second Chamber). 
Dutch constitutionalism can be described as being a rich tapestry of 
customs and documents.29 Two national documents nevertheless stand out in this 
regard. On the one hand, there is the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
(1954), and on the other hand, we find the Constitution of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands (the first version dating back to 1813, but with its last major revision 
in 1983). Of the two, the Charter is the less known, but the higher in terms of 
legal hierarchy nonetheless. It states that the Kingdom consists of equal partners, 
i.e., the Netherlands, Aruba, Curacao and Sint Maarten (the latter three islands 
being situated in the Caribbean), and regulates the relations between these 
constituent entities of the Kingdom. The Dutch Constitution itself however, is 
only applicable to the Netherlands and foresees a decentralised unitary state. I will 
focus here on this last document, which is in effect the most important and 
prominent one. 
The constitutional dispensation of the Netherlands can reasonably be seen 
as that of a democratic rechtsstaat.30 This means that the Dutch democracy is not 
intended to be left to its own devices completely, but that it is expected to operate 
within the recognised boundaries of a rechtsstaat, i.e., in terms of protecting 
fundamental rights through a bill of rights (ranging from classical to socio-
                                                          
28 On this M. Adams, “De nieuwe Belgische Senaat en het wetgevingsproces: kamer van reflectie 
of doublure? Enkele beschouwingen in het licht van de Nederlandse situatie” [The new Belgian 
Senate: Chamber of reflexion or duplication? Considerations with a view to the Dutch situation], 
in RegelMaat. Tijdschrift voor Wetgevingsvraagstukken 1996, p. 230-238. 
29 G. Van der Schyff, Judicial Review of Legislation. Constitutionalism Personified in the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and South Africa, Dordrecht: Springer, 2010, par. 37 (on which this 
alinea is partly based). 
30 See about this also G. Van der Schyff, o.c. par. 35. 
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economic rights, prominently encapsulated in Chapter 1 of the Dutch 
Constitution) and respecting people’s liberty. 
Deserving special attention here, and in strong contrast to Belgium, is that 
the Dutch Constitution explicitly forbids judicial constitutional review.31 The 
debate regarding constitutional review in the Netherlands is indeed an old, yet 
undecided one. It is also informative and typical of Dutch constitutional culture 
and design. As just stated, the Dutch Constitution was adopted in 1814 and was 
revised on a number of occasions since then.32 Importantly, the revision of 1848 
saw constitutional review prohibited by Section 115(2), which stated that “statutes 
are inviolable”. This provision was included at the insistence of the government at 
the time and was contrary to the opinion of a State Commission entrusted with 
revising the Constitution, as the latter favoured constitutional review by the 
judiciary. Nonetheless, the prohibition became a standard feature of the Dutch 
Constitution, as J.R. Thorbecke, who chaired the State Commission and was a 
noted supporter of constitutional review, warned it would be.33 As a matter of 
fact, it survived all constitutional revisions since 1848. However, while not 
affecting its function, its formulation was changed in the most recent revision in 
1983.. The prohibition is now included in Section 120 and provides that “[t]he 
constitutionality of statutes and treaties shall not be reviewed by the judiciary.” 
Yet, it may not be deduced from the above that the Dutch judiciary may 
never review legislation for compatibility with higher norms. This is because the 
revision of the Constitution in 1953 recognised the power of the judiciary to 
review legislation for compatibility with international treaties. Section 94 states in 
this regard that “legislative regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be 
applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties that are 
binding on all persons or in conflict with resolutions adopted by international 
institutions.” 
When read together, Sections 94 and 120 lead to a rather peculiar 
situation. On the one hand the judiciary is barred from testing the constitutionality 
of statutes, but not from reviewing legislation that enjoys a lesser legal position 
than statutes, as Section 120 only applies to statutes in the sense of ‘acts of 
parliament’. For example, the judiciary may review delegated legislation for 
compatibility with the Constitution, but not to the extent that the enabling statute 
is questioned. Testing the constitutionality of delegated legislation may then not 
be used as an excuse to test the constitutionality of the legislation from which it 
stems. On the other hand however, the judiciary may, on the basis of Section 94, 
review all forms of legislation for compatibility with international treaties and 
resolutions. In practice, this usually means that classical rights guaranteed in 
                                                          
31 See on this also M. Adams and G. van der Schyff, “Constitutional review by the judiciary. A 
Matter of Politics, Democracy or Compensating Strategy?”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 2006, p. 399-414. 
32 For an overview, see J.W. Sap, The Netherlands Constitution 1848-1998. Historical Reflections, 
Utrecht: Lemma, 2000. 
33 J.R. Thorbecke, Bijdrage tot de herziening van de Grondwet [Contribution to the revision of the 
Constitution], 1921, p. 60. 
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international treaties are applied, but not socio-economic rights, bar a few 
exceptions, as the latter rights are usually judged to be not directly enforceable.34 
This chequered situation has been the topic of much debate. Interestingly, 
a report drafted in 1966 by the Interior Ministry’s Section for Constitutional 
Affairs recommended that the prohibition on constitutional review be partially 
lifted to allow the judiciary to test legislation in respect of the classical rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution.35 It was felt that such rights provided their bearers 
with greater protection than rights guaranteed in international law, and therefore 
deserved the benefit of judicial protection: international law was seen as only 
providing minimum norms, and therefore, did not adequately protect rights. 
The debate regarding the introduction of constitutional review by the 
judiciary gained momentum with the publication in 1969 of the second report of 
the State Commission, called upon to render advice in respect of the Constitution 
(and the Electoral Law).36 The Commission considered the recommendation, by 
the Interior Ministry’s Section for Constitutional Affairs, that the prohibition be 
partially lifted. It took note of the arguments commonly used against 
constitutional review. For example, the point was raised that constitutional review 
calls upon the judiciary to make political decisions, instead of entrusting this task 
to the legislature where it is normally considered to belong.37 Furthermore, lifting 
the prohibition would potentially endanger judicial independence, as 
appointments to the bench could then become the object of political contestation 
and influence.38 It was also considered that judicial review of international treaties 
presented a different case altogether and could consequently not be used as a base 
from which to argue for constitutional review. This was founded on the argument 
that the judicial review of international treaties was geared towards engendering 
respect for minimum norms across a variety of legal systems, whereas 
constitutional review was much “closer to home”, as it were.39 In other words, 
constitutional review would amplify the role of the judiciary in the trias politica 
to an unacceptable extent, thereby encroaching on the domain preserved for the 
legislature. These arguments are very much in line with those that dominated the 
European continent after the French Revolution and that found favour with 
numerous Dutch academics, namely that good governance amounted to a clear 
                                                          
34 L. Prakke, J.L. de Reede and G.J.M. van der Wissen, Handboek van het Nederlandse staatsrecht 
[Handbook Dutch Constitutional law], Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 2001, p. 238. 
35 Proeve van een nieuwe Grondwet [Attempt of a new Constitution], 1966. 
36 J.L.M.Th. Cals and A.M. Donner, Tweede Rapport van de Staatscommissie van advies inzake de 
Grondwet en de Kieswet [Second Report of the State Commission concerning an advice for a new 
Constitution and the Electoral law], 1969. 





separation of powers.40 In this case, this would mean a separation between the 
legislature and judiciary―each to its own. 
Nonetheless, the State Commission came to the conclusion by 11 votes to 
6 that constitutional review of classical rights had to be allowed. The point was 
made that such review was necessary to strengthen the position of the individual 
in relation to government. Classical rights were judged as the proper vehicle for 
this, as their primary function lay in keeping government intrusion at bay when it 
came to personal freedom. However, the successive government supported the 
minority of the State Commission in opposing the introduction of constitutional 
review by the judiciary. Political reluctance sealed the fate of reform, and as 
mentioned, the 1848 prohibition on constitutional review survived the 1983 
constitutional revision, albeit with a different formulation. 
This did not bring the debate to an end though. In 1988, the President of 
the District Court in The Hague, sitting in summary proceedings, gave a ruling in 
a case that achieved a large amount of attention.41 The case related to three 
statutes on education, which were amended by the so-called ‘Harmonisation 
Law’. This statute retrospectively limited state funding for students. An 
application was brought requesting the Court not to apply the statute, as it violated 
the general principle of legal certainty. It was argued by the applicants that 
although Section 120 prohibited constitutional review by the judiciary, it did not 
explicitly bar the judiciary from reviewing legislation against (unwritten) general 
legal principles not included in the Constitution – such as that of legal certainty in 
casu. The Court, however, rejected this argument. Section 120 could thus not be 
sidelined in this manner. 
In addition, the applicants also averred that the Harmonisation Law 
violated the principle of legal certainty, as guaranteed in Section 43(1) of the 
aforementioned Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1954. As said, the 
Charter, which acts as a basic law, states that the Kingdom of the Netherlands is 
composed of three equal partners, namely the Netherlands, Aruba, Curacao and 
Sint Maarten. It is distinct to the Constitution, as the latter applies only to the 
Netherlands as such. Moreover, the Charter is technically the highest law in the 
Netherlands. Interestingly enough, the Charter, in contrast to the Constitution, 
does not explicitly prohibit the judiciary from testing the constitutionality of 
statutes from being reviewed by the judiciary, yet also does not explicitly 
empower the judiciary to effect such review. The District Court in The Hague 
judged the absence of a prohibition as reason enough to engage in constitutional 
review of the Harmonisation Law. It consequently held that the Harmonisation 
Law did indeed violate the students’ rights when tested against the Charter and 
                                                          
40 Cfr. A. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989, p. 252; M. Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 193-194. 
41 Pres. District Court, ’s Gravenhage, 11 August 1988, Nederlands Jurisprudentie [Dutch case 
law] 1989, p. 489. 
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consequently refused to apply the offending provisions. This amounted to 
introducing constitutional review by the judiciary. 
The matter was eventually lodged with the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands (Hoge Raad). The Supreme Court joined the court a quo by noting 
that Section 120 could not be interpreted to allow the judicial review of legislation 
against general legal principles. Contrary to the District Court however, the Dutch 
Supreme Court took the view that the Constitution excluded any possibility of 
reviewing legislation in the light of any higher rule whatsoever, bar the exception 
of international law in Section 94 of the Constitution of course. The Court also 
pointed out that, during the revision of the Constitution in 1983, the legislature 
discussed the question whether it was desirable to abolish the rule in Section 120 
prohibiting constitutional review by the judiciary, and that no fundamental 
objections had been raised against it. The Court went on to conclude that the rule 
prohibiting constitutional review by the judiciary, including extra-constitutional 
legal norms, was therefore entirely consistent with the “traditional position”42 
occupied by the courts in the institutional structure of the Dutch state. The 
ultimate judgment on the meaning of the Constitution should accordingly be 
entrusted to the democratically-elected legislature. The Supreme Court noted 
though that the need for civil society to be protected against government had 
increased since 1983, but that it was not for it to exceed its boundaries in this 
respect. In other words, positive law had to prevail, which meant upholding and 
applying the prohibition on constitutional review contained in Section 120 of the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court proceeded to overturn the finding by the court a 
quo that the Harmonisation Law could be tested against the guarantee of legal 
certainty contained in Section 43(1) of the aforementioned Charter. The Court 
also stated that although the Constitution contained an express bar to 
constitutional review by the judiciary, the absence of a similar provision in the 
Charter could not be interpreted as allowing judicial review by implication. The 
Court explained that such a turn of events would neither accord with the intention 
embodied in the Charter, nor would it accord with the principle in the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands, of avoiding judicial review of compliance with constitutional 
documents. The prohibition on constitutional review by the judiciary in Section 
120 of the Constitution could thus not be outflanked by testing the contested 
legislation against the Charter instead. 
This decision did ―again― revive the debate in the Netherlands 
regarding constitutional review by the judiciary. In 1991 the Dutch government 
presented a policy note to, inter alia, the Supreme Court for its considerations in 
an advisory opinion.43 The central question, according to the government, no 
longer revolved around whether constitutional review had to be introduced, but 
centred on the form that it had to take. The Supreme Court supported the idea of 
lifting the prohibition on constitutional review in respect of a number of, mostly 
                                                          
42 Ibid. 
43 Nota inzake rechterlijke toetsing [Policy note concerning judicial review], 1991. 
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classical, rights.44 The Supreme Court also supported the idea of de-concentrated 
judicial review, in other words, empowering all judges to carry out constitutional 
review, instead of reserving this function for a few selected judges or a special 
constitutional court. However, differences of opinion led to the government not 
proposing a constitutional amendment. The government in 1997 again asked the 
Supreme Court for its opinion on constitutional review, but again failed to act, 
and in 2002 submitted a policy note to the legislature.45 This time, it noted that 
although much could be said against constitutional review by the judiciary, it 
nonetheless had a slight preference towards the introduction of de-concentrated 
review. The timing largely coincided with the proposal to amend the Constitution, 
which was tabled by a prominent opposition member of the Dutch legislature.46 
This proposal built on earlier arguments that sought to allow the courts to conduct 
judicial review. It was also met with some success; but in order to amend the 
Dutch Constitution, the proposal had to satisfy the usual criterion of passing two 
readings.47 The first reading implies that both houses of the legislature accept the 
proposal with a simple majority, after which the proposal is subsequently 
reconsidered in a second reading after a general election. The proposal becomes a 
constitutional amendment if passed by a two-thirds majority in both houses during 
this second reading. At the moment, the Second as well as First Chamber of 
Dutch parliament have accepted the proposal ―the First Chamber with a single 
vote majority!―and so the first reading is complete. It is however at this very 
moment widely agreed upon that the proposal will not pass the second reading, 
and that as a result judicial constitutional review will thus not be introduced in the 
Netherlands in the near future. As all this shows, one might characterise Dutch 









How can Belgian and Dutch constitutional culture and accompanying design be 
explained? Arend Lijphart’s political theory could well offer an explanation for 
the specific institutional configuration of both politico-constitutional systems, and 
also of the behavior of the actors shaping these configurations. Lijphart has 
                                                          
44 Published in 7 NJCM-bulletin 1992, p. 243. 
45 Tweede Kamer vergaderjaar 2000-2001 [Second Chamber of Parliament, meetings of 2000-
2001] , 27, 460, no. 1. 
46 Tweede Kamer vergaderjaar 2001-2002 [Second Chamber of Parliament, meetings of 2001-
2002], 28, 331, no. 2. Cfr. Tweede Kamer vergaderjaar 2002-2003 [Second Chamber of 
Parliament, meetings of 2002-2003], 28, 331, no. 9. 
47 Section 137 of the Constitution. 
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termed his theory ‘consociational democracy’.48 It means “government by elite 
cartel to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable 
democracy.”49 
A consociational democracy is most often found in societies, as is clear 
from the definition just cited, that are strongly divided. It was generally assumed 
that political stability was beyond reach for such societies, but Lijphart has 
demonstrated that this nec plus ultra is not untenable for them; political instability 
is thus not a predestined terminus for fragmented or disunited societies. The 
potentially destabilizing effects of division are on the contrary likely to prompt 
the established political actors to search for pragmatic ways to deal with societal 
cleavages. Alternative methods of political accommodation, contrary to regular 
majoritarian politics, are thus explored, and the different segments in society 
actively strive for cooperation, consensus and stability: they seek to find each 
other and to cherish common ground as much as possible. Political differences 
between the ruling groups are, as a result, not politicized or exaggerated and a 
substantial number of the political leaders cooperate in governing the country, 
thus neutralizing destabilizing tendencies. This also prevents major political 
groups from becoming estranged from the political system. As a result, although 
political decision-making in consociational democracies is strongly affected by 
the interplay of past and present political and other tensions, in practice, so the 
theory goes, it operates in a way that defuses these tensions and encourages 
compromise. 
The hallmarks of a consociational democracy are broad government 
coalitions, political proportionality (in elections and representative bodies, but 
also in advisory bodies, the civil service, etc.), mutual rights of veto in political 
decision-making, and ‘pillarisation’. Pillarisation is a term that described the 
vertical organisation of a society along traditional ideological, religious, and/or 
politico-economic divides. Pillarised societies are divided in several smaller 
segments or pillars according to different religions or ideologies. All of these 
pillars have their own social institutions (broadcast companies, newspapers, 
schools and universities, sports clubs, mutual sickness funds, etc.) and resources, 
with each group retaining autonomy of how to use them. 
The Dutch and Belgian societies for the greater part of the twentieth 
century play an important part in (the development of) Lijphart’s views and 
theories. They were both deeply ideologically divided between liberals and 
socialists, and between Catholics and Protestants (in the Netherlands) and 
between Catholics and non-confessional groups of society (in Belgium). 
According to Lijphart, Dutch society from the 1960s onwards was a classic 
                                                          
48 On this, see in particular his The Politics of Accommodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the 
Netherlands, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968; Democracy in Plural Societies: A 
Comparative Exploration, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977; and Democracies: Patterns 
of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1984. 
49 A. Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy”, 21 World Politics 1969, p. 216. 
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example of both a pillarised society and a consociational democracy. And he 
considered Belgium “the most thorough example of a consociational 
democracy.”50 Both Belgium and the Netherlands have nevertheless developed 
into completely different political and constitutional cultures. What is common 
however, is that although in both countries the pillars have crumbled as religious 
division have weakened (although more in the Netherlands than in Belgium), elite 
compromise still remains a key theme and operational devise.51 Indeed, when 
essential societal issues cannot be resolved or addressed via the regular political 
channels, for example because of potential structural political deadlock between 
the political factions in parliament, other elitist bodies are many times empowered 
to cut the knots.52 The issue of judicial constitutional review, dealt with in the 




It might be good to mention here that the demise of the Belgian federal 
government in 2007, which was mentioned previously in this article, was the 
direct result of a decision by the Belgian Constitutional Court on a highly 
sensitive issue: the constituency of Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV), which for the 
federal elections comprised the central bilingual district of Brussels and some 
neighboring parts of Dutch-speaking Flanders (where as a matter of fact many 
French-speaking Belgians live), together containing some 1.6 million inhabitants. 
It has been a politically exceptionally difficult issue for decades. In 2003 the 
Constitutional Court ruled that, after a 2002 electoral reform which was the result 
of a hard-fought political compromise, this constituency contravened the equality 
and non-discrimination clauses of the Constitution. It was the only constituency in 
the country that did not come with a single monolingual province. As a result of 
this 2002 reform, voters in parts of Flanders could vote for French-speaking 
politicians. The Court declared unconstitutional parts of the law concerning this 
compromise,53 also stating that a solution for this situation had to be reached 
                                                          
50 A. Lijphart, “The Belgian example of cultural coexistence in comparative perspective”, in A. 
Lijphart (ed.), Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium. The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided 
Society, Berkeley (University of California): Institute of International Studies, 1981, p. 1 (italics 
added). See also A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, p. 223-238. 
51 R. Hague and M. Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007, p. 115. 
52  On this, see, e.g., C. Guarneri and P. Pederzoli, The Power of Judges. A Comparative 
Study of Courts and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 161-180. Hirschl too 
refers to this work (p. 33). 
53 Judgement 73/2003 of 26 May 2003. To be found in Dutch, French and German on: 
www.const-court.be/public. See D. Sinardet, “From consociational consciousness to majoritarian 
myth: Consociational democracy, multi-level politics and the case of Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde”, 
45 Acta Politica 2010, p. 346-369 and S. Lindemans, “Het probleem Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde. 
Analyse van een staatsrechtelijke doos van Pandora” [The problem Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde. 
Analysis of a constitutional Box of Pandora], Jura Falconis 2005-2006, p. 473-504. 
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before the 2007 federal elections. A solution however was not reached, and its 
contention made the post-election coalition negotiations very difficult. In 
November 2007, the Dutch-speaking members of parliament almost unanimously 
voted to split up the constituency. This was the first time ever a single language 
group did so in view of a sensitive issue like this, which put a lot of pressure on 
the relations between the different language groups. The dire prospect of the 
conflicts of interest54 and alarm bell55 procedures loomed largely, and the 
‘conflicts of interest’ procedure was actually resorted to. This caused considerable 
delay in resolving the issue, institutionally and otherwise. In 2010 the government 
fell again, before agreement on this topic between the different political factions 
was reached.56 
What may not be immediately obvious to outsiders however is that the 
difficulties surrounding this electoral district have to do with territorial-linguistic 
claims. Due to the constituency’s hybrid nature, the Dutch-speaking Flemish 
political parties wanted it to be split, which would create two separate electoral 
districts: one for the Brussels Region and one district for the Province of Flemish 
Brabant. This would prevent the francophone political parties from attracting 
French-speaking voters outside of bilingual Brussels and put a brake on the 
frenchification of parts of Flanders (especially in the municipalities surrounding 
Brussels) something so greatly feared by the Flemish. 
This is a highly sensitive issue in Belgian politics and society. Brussels 
has, over the centuries, developed from a Dutch-speaking city into a French-
language enclave in Flanders. The legislative fixation in 1962-63 of the language 
border (which was based on the language count of 1947), was meant to stop the 
frenchification of Brussels and its surrounding area. The border was not to be 
based on language counts anymore. The granting of linguistic facilities and rights 
to the French-speaking population in some municipalities was to compensate for 
this. The frenchification however didn’t stop, resulting today in French-speaking 
majorities in officially Dutch-speaking municipalities. The debate as it unfolds 
today is partly put in terms of whether or not the language facilities were 
introduced as a temporary measure to give the French-speaking population the 
opportunity to learn to speak Dutch (of which many Dutch speakers say has been 
to no avail), or introduced as some sort of fundamental right which almost by 




                                                          
54 See footnote 19. 
55 See main text surrounding footnote 19. 
56 All this provokes the question whether the 2007 and 2010 elections in the aforementioned 
constituency were conducted in a legally correct manner. Opinions differ. The issue was, however, 
negotiated in the 2011 government formation, and a settlement was reached. In July 2013, the 
particulars were being put in legislation. 
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Consider the Netherlands now. Dutch society and its institutions have long 
availed themselves of channels, other than judicial constitutional review, to deal 
with social or political conflicts and interests, including the protection of 
fundamental rights. Whereas previously, societal problems were solved within the 
pillars, today, pivotal organizations dealing with these problems include, next to 
parliament, the Council of State, the Social and Economic Council, the Auditor’s 
Office, the Scientific Council for Government Policy, the High Council of the 
Judiciary, Ombudspersons, and other public advisory, controlling or decision-
making bodies (‘poldering’ bodies).57 This fact might tone down one of the 
essential arguments put forward in the aforementioned proposal to introduce 
judicial constitutional review in the Netherlands, namely, that it would be more 
beneficial to have an extra link in the chain to create new legislation or regulation 
and essentially that an extra-legislative check is necessary to secure proper checks 
and balances.58. More particularly, it is argued that the dwindling influence of 
parliament makes judicial constitutional review necessary in order to safeguard or 
enforce the protective function of the law. But from a systemic perspective, there 
would not appear to be a dearth of checks and balances in the Netherlands, despite 
the courts not being able to review the constitutionality of legislation. 
What is important to note here, is that as a result of all of this, in the 
Netherlands, there has been, for many years, talk of a mild or moderate 
constitutional culture, and of a strong distance between constitution and politics: 
“It is virtually impossible to find any politician in The Hague [the seat of 
Parliament, MA] who would want to win or lose a political debate on the ground 
that a certain topic would be contravening the Dutch Constitution.”59 As a result, 
there are very few people, besides those who belong to the inner circle of 
constitutional specialists that consider themselves as the ‘guardians of the 
constitution.’ Concerning significant topics, Dutch constitutional life is 
developing next to the written Constitution, in constitutional customary law for 
example, with all the dubiety that accompanies this last source of constitutional 
law. To give but a few examples: the development and limitation of the 
monarch’s power is predominantly arranged without the Constitution, as such, 
being amended; even stronger: the Constitution is to a large extent silent about 
this topic. The same is true for cabinet formation proceedings, which are arranged 
by means of constitutional convention. Also, nothing can be found about political 
parties or the independence of the judiciary in the Dutch Constitution, and there is 
no word whatsoever in the Constitution about the European Union or about the 
‘rule of law’, neither is there any inspiring preamble or prelude. In addition, to 
give a last example, the independence of both Chambers of parliament is only 
                                                          
57 The Council of State for example advises, next to being the highest administrative court, on the 
legislative quality (including the constitutionality) of pending bills. 
58 Parliamentary Proceedings II, 2001-2002, 28 331, no.3, pp.13-15. 
59 L.F.M. Besselink, “Constitutionele klimatologie” [Constitutional climatology] Nederlands 
Juristenblad 1998, p. 212. Also about Dutch constitutional culture G.F.M. van der Tang, 
Grondwet en grondwetsidee [Verfassung and the idea of a constitution], Arnhem: Gouda Quint 
1998, p. 373-375. 
20 
 
implicitly acknowledged, through the Section that states that each Chamber 




The contemporary constitutional and institutional structures of Belgium and the 
Netherlands, as set out previously in this article (“Some Facts About etc.”), can 
indeed be understood or explained from the point of view of consociationalism. In 
Belgium, federal government coalitions usually have a fairly broad support base 
with a minimum of three coalition partners (and often more), and it is clear that 
changes in the country’s institutional set-up cannot possibly be decided by a 
simple majority in parliament; there are many institutionalized mechanisms in 
place to reach political consensus or pacification on these issues. For this reason, 
Pinder has defined consociational arrangements as “institutions and procedures 
that encourage consensus rather than allowing the will of those who represent a 
simple majority of the population to prevail.”60 Majority-type democracy, from 
this point of view, is “the antithesis of consociational democracy.”61 All this 
means that the Belgian Constitution has a rigid and highly political nature, being 
expressly called upon in public and political discourse; possibly with the 
Constitutional Court as leverage or as a background threat, especially whenever 
the relations between the two communities that make up the country are at stake. 
And although the Netherlands is also essentially ruled by elites, and in this 
respect still has a distinctly consociational flavour to it, its constitutional culture is 
nonetheless rather different from the one that is prevalent in Belgium. In the 
Netherlands, the accommodation of political conflicts is arranged by many means, 
but not through evoking constitutional law. In line with Lijphart’s reasoning, it 
could well be argued that the renowned late 20th-century Dutch ‘polder model’ 
(consultation model) is an offshoot of a consociational democracy. The phrase 
‘polder model’ has uncertain origins, but is mostly used to describe the typically 
Dutch version of consensus politics, developed in the 1980s and 90s in socio-
economic affairs.62 It is a short hand, referring to the typical Dutch ‘polders’63, for 
an institutionalized form of cooperation and consensus seeking between political 
actors, social partners and other societal organizations. The term was, however, 
also quickly adopted for a broader meaning, i.e., pragmatic elite consensus 
decision-making in the face of diversity and plurality in general. So, following the 
gradual dissolution of the old ‘pillarised’ way of organizing Dutch society, the 
                                                          
60 J. Pinder, “Multinational Federations”, in M. Burges and J. Pinder (eds.), Multinational 
Federations, London: Routledge, 2007, p. 9. 
61 A. Lijphart, “The Belgian example of cultural coexistence in comparative perspective”, o.c., p. 
1. 
62 J.J. Woldendorp, The Polder Model: From Disease to Miracle? Dutch Neo-Corporatism 1965 – 
2000, Amsterdam: Thela, 2005, p. 28. 
63 A ‘polder’ is a low-lying piece of land, which was originally flooded by water and was later 
won as land. It is enclosed by embankments to prevent the land from flooding. It is a very typical 
(though not exclusive) Dutch phenomenon. 
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Dutch system of political decision-making found new, distinctly non-judicial 
ways to channel potential bottlenecks in the political decision-making processes; 
ways which were completely different from the ones that prevailed in Belgium. 
As a result of all this, Dutch constitutional culture is not really marked by 
the use of normative language and obligations that come with the concept of law, 
and which is so typical for Belgian constitutional discourse. We might thus typify 
Dutch constitutional culture as relativistic and the two aforementioned 
constitutional documents —i.e., the Charter and the Constitution— can be 
understood as more general maps as opposed to robust guarantees in the service 
of the democratic rechtsstaat. This is even more so, since courts in the country 
generally show great restraint in their dealings with higher law (as the European 
Convention on Human Rights for example).64 The Constitution does not function 
as a strong normative document; it is rather a codification of political practice 
than the other way round.65 The Dutch Constitution as such, as is also generally 
agreed upon, is moreover rather uninspiring; a construction with no character, the 
builders of which were rather provident and drifty.66 All this of course does not 
necessarily mean that political life develops arbitrarily. It might also mean that 
political and social practice are intimately in tune with the constitution )and the 
democratic values it expresses). And since the Netherlands is generally regarded 
as a tolerant and democratic nation, the Dutch might as well praise themselves 
with such a situation. If that is a correct evaluation, it would not be unfair to state, 






Do Belgian and Dutch constitutional layout promote societal consensus and 
stability? The short answer to this question is that both its track records are not 
optimal. I will in this paragraph elaborate on this, and again split up my analysis 




Constitutional design in Belgium, as much as it fosters cooperation, structurally 
hinders accommodation techniques. As it develops, consociationalism can harden 
                                                          
64 G. van der Schyff, o.c., par. 40. 
65 As Dutch scholar Van der Hoeven already in 1958 observed, in his seminal De plaats van de 
grondwet in het constitutionele recht [The place of the written Constitution in constitutional law], 
Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1958. 
66 About this G. van der Tang, “Een Grondwet voor de politieke samenleving”[ A constitution for 
a political society], in De Grondwet herzien, 25 jaar later [Rethininking the Constitution; 25 years 
later], p. 91 and 94. 
67 K. Loewenstein, o.c., p. 148. 
22 
 
or rigidify pre-existing group differences68, and it is clear that the Constitutional 
Court is not necessarily conducive to accommodation. At least two problems 
stand out. 
The first can be found on the level of political parties and elite 
estrangement. In a consociational democracy, Stephen Holmes has aptly 
observed, the political elites must both represent and not represent their 
constituencies: “They must hold their followers’ loyalty, but not reproduce their 
uncompromising attitudes in national negotiations. Such cross-sectarian 
cooperation among elites requires ‘a strengthening of the political inertness of the 
non-elite public and their deferential attitudes to the segmental leaders.’”69 The 
trouble is that in Belgium this seems hardly possible since national political 
parties no longer exist. Since the 1960s Belgium has had regional political parties, 
and today quite a few of these parties have no ideological counterpart on the other 
side of the language border. And even when they do (as is the case with the 
Christian-democratic, liberal and social-democratic political parties) they are split 
on many important issues. Today, the discursive focus of politics and of public 
opinion is almost exclusively geared towards the regional level and its sentiments. 
Federal politicians are first and foremost representatives of their respective 
regions in which they are elected. This makes for a not necessarily Belgian 
minded political elite with hardly any Belgian identity.70 All this has removed 
incentives for moderate consensual and electoral politics, and has resulted in a big 
gap between regional electoral pledges and the reality of national politics. This 
gulf has been widened by a split media landscape,71 and the fact that since the 
1990s it is possible to form different or asymmetrical regional and federal 
government coalitions.72 Consociationalism asks for the willingness and ability to 
                                                          
68 R.H. Pildes, o.c., p. 333. 
69 S. Holmes, Passions and Constraint. On the Theory of Liberal Democracy, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 212 (referring to Lijphart). Peters describes this as follows: “The 
federal nature of Belgian politics means that the party leaders must be thinking about their role in 
the context of a multi-level governance arrangement, and must conceptualise their role as the 
cement that binds the various elements of the system together.” B. Guy Peters, 
“Consociationalism, Corruption and Chocolate: Belgian Exceptionalism”, 29 West European 
Politics 2006, p. 1081. 
70 Deschouwer therefore talks about distrust at the top: the elite does not trust the system, because 
the political system is perceived to benefit the other more. K. Deschouwer, The Politics of 
Belgium. Governing a Divided Society, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009, p. 233. 
71 Which, if it even reports on this issue, gives a very one-sided and even partial account of events 
and political life on the other side of the language border. D. Sinardet and M. Temmerman, 
“Political journalism across the language border: communicative behaviour in political interviews 
by Dutch- and French-speaking journalists with Dutch- and French-speaking politicians in federal 
Belgium”, in J. Darquennes (ed.), Multilingualism and applied comparative linguistics: vol. 2: 
cross-cultural communication, translation studies and multilingual terminology, Cambridge: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008, p. 110-138. 
72 K. Deschouwer, The Politics of Belgium, p. 233-236. H. Van Goethem, Belgium and the 
Monarchy. From National Independence to National Disintegration, Brussels: EPA, 2010, p. 269-
271. B. Guy Peters rather neutrally observes that “there is not necessarily a greater identification 
of the public with Belgium as an entity than with the constituent parts.” He adds that the regions 
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compromise and reach consensus between the language communities, but before 
that is possible, in Belgium, “elected politicians wanting to govern at the federal 
level must first solve the problems that they have created themselves.”73 
The second consociational fault line, which lines up to the first one in that 
both stimulate calls for more, in this case, Flemish autonomy (and in both cases 
the solutions desired become part of the problem for consociationalist theory and 
politics), has to do with the specificity of Belgian federalism. Federalism is 
mostly intended to bring the separate units of a state together.74 The Belgian 
variety of federalism however has the exact opposite aim of separating its two 
main components75; Belgian federalism is thoroughly bipolar. While federalism 
tends to work well when there are more than two basically equal partners, 
“[Belgian federalism] is the juxtaposition of two peoples moving in different 
directions.”76 As a result, social tensions among the groups can easily worsen, 
since ‘the problem’ can always be traced to “the same other”:77 political parties 
belong to one language group, as do members of parliament (including the 
accompanying veto mechanisms), federal government is based on linguistic 
parity, etc. This is even more so since the rather far-reaching allocation of 
competences to the Regions and Communities highlight the differences rather 
than the commonalities between the two main regions and language groups. To 
put it in financial terms, the fact that there are significant financial transfers from 
one economically solid region —Flanders— to the economically less well off 
region —Wallonia— has a profound impact on Flemish public opinion. Many 
would reason that the financing region should also have a more decisive say in the 
other’s state of affairs and in their institutional and constitutional relations (i.e., 
                                                                                                                                                              
have become the arena in which the conflict between both parts of Belgium are played out. B. Guy 
Peters, l.c., p. 1083 and p. 1084. 
73 K. Deschouwer, The Politics of Belgium, p. 237. I believe that this is the core of one of the main 
criticisms of consociationalism by Donald Horowitz: the granting of autonomy to different 
communities not necessarily promotes attitudes and behavior that promotes stability. D. Horowitz, 
“Constitutional Design: an Oxymoron?”, in I. Shapiro and S. Macedo (eds.), Designing 
Democratic Institutions, New York: New York University Press, 2000, p. 253-284 and 
“Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes”, in A. Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of 
Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 15-36. For an excellent overview of the debate between Lijphart and 
Horowitz, see S. Choudhry, “Bridging comparative politics and comparative constitutional law: 
Constitutional design in divided societies”, in S. Choudhry, o.c., p. 15-26. See also, R.B. 
Andeweg, “Consociational democracy”, 3 Annual Review of Political Science 2000, p. 509-536. 
74 Interestingly, Lijphart himself seems to have recognized this early one: “A multiple balance of 
power among the segments of a plural society is more conducive to consociational democracy than 
a dual balance of power or hegemony by one of the segments, because if one segment has a clear 
majority its leaders may attempt to dominate rather than cooperate with the rival minority.” A. 
Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 55. 
75 Belgian federalism might have this in common with Canada or Spain, or possibly the United 
Kingdom (devolution). 
76 As former prime minister Tindemans said in 1971: Parliamentary Proceedings, Senate, 7 July 
1971, p. 2368. 
77 K. Deschouwer, The Politics of Belgium, p. 235. 
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how they relate to each other).78 However, as we have seen, decision-making on 
the future of the Belgian state, including its financial allocation mechanisms,79 
always involves the other veto player who is perceived to be radically different. 
And since calls for more autonomy tend to come from the Dutch-language part of 
the country, this ‘other’ is also a linguistic minority. 
But how long will this situation last? “Prediction is difficult, especially 
concerning the future”, Niels Bohr reportedly once said. The complexity of the 
Belgian situation makes predicting an even more hazardous challenge than it 
normally is. From the perspective of this article, the one million dollar question is 
whether Belgium’s constitutional and institutional set-up is conducive to societal 
stability and peace (and in line with this: whether Belgium will survive its 
seemingly permanent political crisis). So far it seems as if it has indeed been 
conducive to societal stability: Belgium is not marked by riots and violent 
uprisings between the different communities. And even the relative instability of 
Belgian governments can be seen as systemically functional because 
governmental break-up might also be understood as one of the means of reducing 
the possibilities for political deadlock and blockage.80 Even so, there are 
indications that in Belgium consociational strategies can no longer be fully relied 
upon. For example, the cries for more autonomy have in recent years led to the 
rise of a strong democratic nationalist political party in Flanders, NV-A (Nieuw 
Vlaamse Alliantie, New Flemish Alliance), which is currently part of the Flemish 
government coalition. The NV-A would appear to have replaced the more 
extremist and separatist right-wing Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) as the 
voters’ favourite nationalist political party; until recently the latter did rather well 
in elections, but politically it has remained a marginal force because of its 
xenophobic views of foreigners and the resulting exclusion of any government 
coalition.81 It is also at heart an opposition party. The current enormous success of 
the NV-A might be a sign of a changing political constellation —separatism is 
becoming a real issue in political discourse; maintenance of the status quo does 
not appear to be the only option any longer, at least not for the Flemish part of the 
country, nor is it realistic given the institutional and historical weaknesses of the 
Belgian state.82 And although demands for more autonomy seem to come mainly 
from the Dutch-speaking side of Belgium, these demands are highly relevant to 
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the French-speaking part. Previously, when tensions ran high and one of the 
actors insisted on institutional reform, the other side perceived that as a quasi-
obligation to negotiate a solution for the problem concerned.83 Today however, 
the positions are hardening and some development towards a more confederal 
system seems to be the unavoidable next step. 
Logically, a desire to coalesce implies a need for it.84 So in the light of 
what has been said so far, we might well wonder why Belgium does not split up. 
The most convincing explanation for the current situation is Brussels. There are at 
least two elements that are relevant here. The first is the economically vital 
position of Brussels: it is a significant place of employment for many people from 
out of Brussels. Breaking up comes at considerable cost, possibly too high to even 
seriously consider. The second element is the emotional element: although 
nowadays Brussels is essentially a French-speaking city, geographically 
surrounded by Flanders, historically it is of Dutch-speaking origin. The 
frenchification of Brussels, which started in the mid-nineteenth century, is a 
“romantic” source of frustration for many. “If Flanders were not to claim or need 
Brussels, the structure of Belgium could be much less complicated. Both 
communities see Brussels as their (capital) city and that is what has created the 
double federation of Regions and Communities.”85 In the meantime, tensions 
continue to build up and Flemish calls for more autonomy are becoming stronger 
and stronger, and the willingness to federally cooperate in a consensual manner 
seems to be losing ground. 
The Belgian Constitution has institutionalized political distrust and 
instability, by installing a kind of disintegrating federalism. As a result it has not 
been capable of installing a sense of nationhood —with mutual respect and 
common interests between the (populations of the) different communities— or 
Verfassungspariotismus in its nationals.86 The Belgian Constitution is an 
encumbering one, and the type of decision-making it encourages can hardly serve 
as the ‘germ of a nascent sense of political community’ or promote the general 




In the Netherlands, consociational structures and pillarisation have been waning 
for quite some time already―because of secularization and emancipation―, but 
new social cleavages have arrived instead. The composition of Dutch society has 
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been changing significantly through immigration in the last few decades, 
especially as a result of the influx of new ethnic and religious minorities, Muslims 
in particular.87 This presents the country with many pressing issues surrounding 
integration, even more so since these immigrants, in many instances, turn out to 
be members of disadvantaged groups. The pressures were amplified by e.g. the 
murder of politician P. Fortuyn in 2002 and of public commentator T. Van Gogh 
in 2004. As Andeweg and Irwin make clear, the elitist character of Dutch politics 
has, as a result, been under increasing attack in the last decade or so: political 
competition seemed to intensify with no guaranteed voters available anymore (a 
result of depillarisation), the rise of the populist right, and calls for a more direct 
democracy have been multiple.88 There have however hardly been any 
institutional or political reforms. 
In the same vein, the Dutch Constitution still has no role to play in the 
process of societal integration: in the Netherlands constitutional relativism still 
prevails, even in the context of fundamental rights, and even though this 
relativism might not be adapted to contemporary Dutch society anymore. To give 
but a few examples in the context of integration and diversity: the judicial section 
of the Dutch Conseil d’État (Raad van State), the highest administrative court in 
the country, has for some time already been limiting the rights of refugees to a 
considerable and impressive extent (also when compared to other European 
countries!). The same is true for the right to family reunification, i.e., a legally 
recognized reason for immigration in many countries, enabling a family to 
immigrate to a country where one (or more) of their family members already 
resides. Although the Netherlands, in these contexts, has been convicted for 
contravening human rights law on several occasions already, there has been 
hardly any policy or judicial change. The 2010 Government, in its coalition 
agreement, even stated that there would be a “restrictive and selective” policy, 
where possible, concerning migration, even if that would mean changing the 
European Convention of Human Rights.89 Such policy can certainly be understood 
as a response to the aforementioned attacks on elite political culture and the 
increase of political competition. 
It should be clear though that we are not dealing here with a ‘mere’ 
normative issue (“Fundamental rights should of course be upheld!”), but with an 
issue that is explicitly instrumentally relevant too: what does it do with human 
beings when they are ―or feel― excluded from full citizenship, are treated as 
outsiders or bestowed with marginality? What loyalty can one then expect from 
the community in which they are present? What kind of unrest and social 
instability will be the result of this? These are questions that are rarely asked. Let 
it be clear that the aim should then not be to erase differences amongst people. 
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What is nevertheless important and necessary is to create and support a political 
and moral climate where everyone has a change to make something out of his or 
her life. This is what Rosanvallon refers to as ‘relational equality’ or ‘equality as 
social relation’90; a form of equality that is not only dealing with the distribution 
of wealth, but on the basis of which it is also possible to recognize and 
acknowledge the individual as a full member of a society. There is a clear role for 
a type of constitutionalism here, which can be conducive in recognizing full 
equality and thereby enabling loyalty to the democratic rechtsstaat (citoyen; 
citizenship). A constitution in this respect represents not just a (incidental 





ROUNDING UP: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
 
In Passions and Constraint, Stephen Holmes writes that a constitution disables 
political decision-making in that it sets up procedural roadblocks by, for example, 
introducing supermajority decision-making rules or by enacting bills of rights; the 
idea is to thereby prevent tyranny and other abuses of power.91 Holmes terms this 
‘negative constitutionalism’. In a divided society, as in any liberal society, 
constitutions must fulfill this negative or disabling role.92 A constitution at the 
same time can, according to Holmes, also assume an enabling role, which he calls 
‘positive constitutionalism’: it can help create the very demos which governs itself 
through the constitutional regime. In this sense a state can also use its powers to 
achieve cooperation and support. Even stronger, if a divided society also wants to 
be a free society, negative and positive constitutionalism should be connected to 
each other. Choudhry puts it like this: 
 
[B]ecause of a history of conflict or a lack of shared existence, the 
constitution is often the principal vehicle for the forging of a common 
political identity, which is, in turn, necessary to make that constitutional 
regime work. To some extent, the constitution can foster the development 
of a common political identity by creating institutional spaces for shared 
decision making among members of different ethnocultural groups. 
Concrete experiences of shared decision-making within the framework of 
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the rule of law, and without resource to force or fraud, can serve as the 
germ of a nascent sense of political community.93 
 
I submit that in both Belgium and the Netherlands negative and positive 
constitutionalism are not connected and thus cannot be (mutually) reinforcing. 
Although the Belgian Constitution does play a significant role in channelling 
and/or constraining the local politico-institutional situation, it does not succeed in 
taking up an enabling role. The Constitution itself is at best a rational 
construction, possessing an accidental nature and a complex technicality; it 
represents a status quo and a form of federalism that does not create any Belgian 
public space. In the Netherlands, the Constitution is fading ever more into 
oblivion, neglecting its possible enabling role too. 
As a result both the Belgian and Dutch Constitutions are in danger of no 
longer being able to govern the dynamics of the power process and become 
instead governed by it: a warning of the demise of a state’s capacity to effectively 
act as the agent of its citizens’ well being. In such conditions, the constitution runs 
the risk of falling prey to political manipulation. They are developing into 
nominal constitutions, i.e., constitutions that lack existential reality. Loewenstein 
compared such constitutions to a badly tailored suit.94 The democratic rechtsstaat, 
a concept which is given authority and effect through constitutions and 
constitutionalism, can however not fly on autopilot; it needs maintenance and 
active direction. The introduction of judicial constitutional review in the 
Netherlands might be one way of doing this, or the creation of better developed 
form of constitutional literacy, as might be the installation of a Belgian public 
space through (re)introducing a federal electoral district for federal parliament.95 
All this of course raises more general questions of a constitution’s 
normative and practical value, i.e., questions similar to the ones Loewenstein was 
troubled about and with which I started this article: under what conditions are 
political actors usually prepared to comply with constitutional requirements or 
take them into account? The answer to questions like this are, I believe, highly 
contingent and not clear cut; there does not seem to exist an objective set of rules 
for matching a people and their situation with a set of institutions.96 Nevertheless, 
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both the Belgian and Dutch cases can, so it seemed, be instructive in telling us a 
bit more about the constitutional conditions that might be conducive to societal 
stability. It is however of the utmost importance to generate more knowledge 
about this, because societal unrest usually comes with an array of negative 
consequences (the possibility of violence being one of them). Democratic politics 
without positive constitutionalism is in any case troublesome; in the long run no 
democracy can survive such a state of affairs.97 
                                                                                                                                                              
instead claiming that “an ideal constitution has never existed, and will never exist.” K. 
Loewenstein, o.c. 
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